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1  UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.21 at 6 (Oct. 21, 2003).
2 Id.
IPSE DIXIT AT THE I.C.J.
Professor Sean D. MurphyGeorge Washington Universitysmurphy@law.gwu.edu(draft paper forthcoming Volume 99:1 of the American Journal of International Law (2005))
In October 2003, the Israeli permanent representative addressed the UN General Assemblyon why Israel felt compelled to build a lengthy barrier spanning hundreds of kilometers across certainareas of the West Bank. Among other things, Ambassador Dan Gillerman stated:
[A] security fence has proven itself to be one of the most effective non-violent methods forpreventing terrorism in the heart of civilian areas. The fence is a measure wholly consistentwith the right of States to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter. Internationallaw and Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001),have clearly recognized the right of States to use force in self-defence against terroristattacks, and therefore surely recognize the right to use non-forcible measures to that end.1 
Ambassador Gillerman noted that the factual and legal basis for Israel’s position had “been set forthin numerous Israeli statements before the [Security] Council and this Assembly, in countless lettersto the Secretary General and in a variety of publicly available materials and official statements.”2
23 Article 51 provides in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherentright of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of theUnited Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintaininternational peace and security.” UN CHARTER Art. 51.
4 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,Advisory Opinion, para. 139 (July 9, 2004), reprinted in 43 ILM 1009 (2004) [hereinafter LegalConsequences Advisory Opinion].
In its advisory opinion of July 2004, the International Court considered and disposed of thislegal basis for the construction of the Israeli barrier in a single paragraph. After quoting Article 51of the UN Charter,3 the Court stated:
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel doesnot claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign state.
The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying theconstruction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thusdifferent from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373(2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of itsclaim to be exercising a right of self-defence.
Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 has no relevance in this case.4 
35  Speech by H.E. Judge Shi Jiuyong, President of the International Court of Justice, to theSixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, The Advisory Function of theInternational Court of Justice (Nov. 5, 2004), at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
The position taken by the Court with respect to the jus ad bellum is startling in its brevityand, upon analysis, very unsatisfactory. At best, the position represents imprecise drafting, and thuscalls into question whether the advisory opinion process necessarily helps the Court “to develop itsjurisprudence and to contribute to the progress of international law.”5 At worst, the position conflictswith the language of the UN Charter, its travaux préparatoires, the practice of states andinternational organizations, and common sense. In addition to the lack of cogent analytical reasoning,the Court’s unwillingness to pursue a serious inquiry into the facts underlying Israel’s legal positionhighlights a disquieting aspect of the Court’s institutional capabilities: an apparent inability tograpple with complex fact patterns associated with armed conflict. Overall, the Court’s peremptorystyle in addressing the jus ad bellum reflects an unfortunate ipse dixit approach to judicial reasoning;the Court apparently expects others to accept an important interpretation of the law and facts simplybecause the Court says it is so.
I.  THE SCOPE OF UN CHARTER ARTICLE 51
The Court’s finding that “Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of aninherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State” mightbe regarded as ambiguous. The Court did not expressly state that Article 51 only recognizes self-defense by a state against another state. Perhaps the Court was simply recognizing that a state may
46 See Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 35, Legal Consequences AdvisoryOpinion, supra note 4 (“Although this statement is undoubtedly correct, as a reply to Israel’sargument it is, with all due respect, beside the point.”).
7 Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 138.
8 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 33, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,supra note 4.
9 Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, para. 6, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,supra note 4.
self-defend against another state as one type of self-defense that arises under Article 51.6 To theextent that any further implication is drawn from the language, one might just ascribe suchimplication to imprecise drafting on the part of the Court.There are two problems, however, with such an interpretation of the Court’s finding. First,Israel directly asserted that it was invoking a right of self-defense as permitted under Article 51against non-state terrorist attacks, and in the paragraph prior to its finding, the Court recognized thatassertion.7 This context thus strongly indicates that the Court considered the Israeli position that itwas engaging in self-defense under Article 51 against a non-state actor and rejected that position onthe ground that Article 51 only contemplates self-defense by a state against another state. Second,the Court was well-aware that its position would be interpreted as excluding self-defense againstnon-state actors, since two of the judges objected to the Court’s position on that basis. In her separateopinion, Judge Higgins interpreted the Court as saying that “self-defence is available only when anarmed attack is made by a State.”8 In his declaration in dissent, Judge Buergenthal stated that theCourt’s position was problematic because Article 51, in affirming the inherent right of self-defense,“does not make its exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another State.”9 Assuming that these views were made known to the Court in the course of the Court’s
510 The Court obviously was unwilling to regard Palestine as a “state” for purposes ofArticle 51, which is consistent with the fact that Palestine is not a member of the United Nations.However, the Court’s treatment of Palestine throughout the proceedings (allowing it to makewritten and oral submissions), and in much of the Court’s jus in bello analysis, appears to regardPalestine as the functional equivalent of a state. Thus, the Court was comfortable regarding theWest Bank and Gaza strip as sufficiently close to being territory of a foreign state for purposes ofapplying the Fourth Geneva Convention, going so far as to note that the territory was part ofJordan at one time and that Jordan and Israel were parties to the Geneva Conventions when the1967 armed conflict broke out. See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para.101. Yet the Court refrained from regarding such territory as sufficiently close to being theterritory of a foreign state for purposes of applying a different treaty, the UN Charter, to whichJordan and Israel were also parties as of 1967. Only with respect to the jus ad bellum argumentdoes Palestine’s formal position as a non-state seem to become a dispositive factor for the Court.Giving Palestine a quasi-state status for purposes of appearing before the Court and forpurposes of applying certain treaties that operate as between states, but not for other treaties,results in an unexplained double-standard. If Palestine were regarded as the functional equivalentof a state for purposes of Article 51, Israel presumably would impute many of the terrorist attacksto that “state.” See Written Statement of Israel, para. 3.76  (Jan. 29, 2004), Legal ConsequencesAdvisory Opinion, supra note 4 (stating that the “evidence of attribution, of commission andomission, [of terrorist acts to Palestine] is great”).
11 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 31(1), 1155 UNTS331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
deliberations, as would normally be the case, the Court was well-aware of how its language wasgoing to be interpreted and nevertheless chose to adopt that interpretation.10 Unfortunately, the Courtprovided no analysis of why Article 51 was restricted to armed attacks by states even though, forseveral reasons, analysis was merited. The ordinary meaning of Article 51. First, there is nothing in the language of Article 51 ofthe Charter that requires the exercise of self-defense to turn on whether an armed attack wascommitted directly by, or can be imputed to, another state. Article 51 speaks of the right of self-defense by a “Member of the United Nations” against an armed attack without any qualification asto who or what is conducting the armed attack. Looking at the “ordinary meaning” of the terms ofArticle 51,11 there is no basis for reading into the text a restriction on who the attacker must be.
6ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objectand purpose.”). The Court has invoked this provision of the Vienna Convention on manyoccasions, including in its advisory opinion. See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supranote 4, para. 94.
12 VCLT, supra note 11, Art. 31(1).
13 UN CHARTER Art. 2(4).
14  UN CHARTER pmbl., Arts. 55-56.
15 See S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl. (Apr. 28, 2004) (acting under Chapter VII to addressterrorism “and the risk that non-State actors” may acquire weapons of mass destruction); S.C.Res. 1566, para. 1 (Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1377, annex,pmbl. (Nov. 12, 2001); see also S.C. Res. 1070, pmbl. (Aug. 16, 1996); S.C. Res. 731, pmbl.(Jan. 21, 1992). The Security Council has defined a “non-State actor” as an “individual or entity,not acting under the lawful authority of any State . . . .” S.C. Res. 1540, supra, at footnote.
16 Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, paras. 86-87. 
Indeed, reading the  language in context12 leads to the same conclusion. If one compares the languageused in Article 2(4) of the Charter (which speaks of a use of force by one “Member” against “anystate”),13 one finds that the same construct is not repeated in Article 51. Rather, Article 51 is silenton who or what might commit an armed attack justifying self-defense.Certainly the reasoning underlying this paragraph could not have been that the Charter onlyregulates relations among states. The Charter expressly speaks to the relations of states to non-stateactors14 and the Security Council has repeatedly found that the conduct of non-state actors can be athreat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter.15 The Court itself sawArticle 2(4) (which speaks expressly of action by states against states) as “relevant” law with respectto Israel’s conduct in the “Occupied Palestinian Territory,”16 even though the Court saw no suchrelevance for Article 51 (which is not expressly limited to states) with respect to the exact sameIsraeli conduct.
717 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ14, para. 193 (Judgment of June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment] (“Article 51 is onlymeaningful on the basis that there is a “natural” or “inherent” right of self-defence, and it is hardto see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has beenconfirmed and influenced by the Charter.”). 
18 See id., para. 176; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, AdvisoryOpinion, 1996 ICJ 66, para. 41 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Oil Platforms(Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ 161, para. 51 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil Platforms Judgment] (“TheUnited States must also show that its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attackmade on it”). 
The “inherent right” of self-defense. Second, to understand the full meaning of “self-defense” in Article 51 requires looking beyond the language of Article 51 alone. As the Court itselfhas recognized, Article 51 did not create a right of self-defense; rather, it preserved an inherent rightof self-defense, one that existed in customary international law prior to enactment of the Charter in1945.17 The Court has repeatedly stated that we must look to this customary international law ruleto ascertain the full content of Article 51. Thus, in determining that the principles of necessity andproportionality apply to the exercise of the right of self-defense under Article 51, the Court has reliedupon the existence of those principles in customary international law, since they do not appearanywhere in the text of Article 51.18 Yet when considering the principles of necessity and proportionality under customary
819 See, e.g., Memorial Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, para. 4.18 (June 8,1993), Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 18 (“This condition of lawful self-defence wasreflected in the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Webster, in the celebrated Caroline case,regarded as the locus classicus of the customary right of self-defence.”); Counter-Memorial andCounter-Claim Submitted by the United States of America, paras. 4.43-4.44 (June 23, 1997), OilPlatforms Judgment, supra note 18 (“Webster’s analysis established the requirements ofnecessity and proportionality as cornerstones of the legal doctrine of self-defense.”).
20 See, e.g., MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1024 (5th ed. 2003) (“The traditionaldefinition of the right of self-defence in customary international law occurs in the Carolinecase,”); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 120 (2d ed. 2004) (“Therequirements of necessity and proportionality are often traced back to the 1837 Caroline incident. . . .”).
21 See, e.g., Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, at 362, para. 200 (dissenting opinion ofJudge Schwebel).
22 See 29 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1226, 1137-38 (1857); 30 BRITISH &FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193, 195 (1858) (exchange of letters between the United States and United Kingdom); see R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82,89 (1938).
23 The incident involved a U.K. assertion that its attack in U.S. territory on the schoonerCaroline was permissible self-defense because the schooner had previously been used (and mightbe used again) to ferry supplies across the border to Canada to rebels who were fighting U.K. rulein Canada. In support of his views, Webster cited to eminent scholars of international lawregarding the status of international custom, including Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel.
international law, the precedent that immediately comes to the mind of states,19 scholars,20 andpresumably International Court judges21 is the 1837 Caroline incident. In that clash between theUnited States and the United Kingdom, the two governments settled upon the basic contours of theright of self-defense,22 contours that remain today the touchstone for most discourse on the subject.On its facts, the Caroline incident concerned self-defense as a reaction to attacks by non-state actors(in that case, support by U.S. nationals for a rebellion in Canada).23 Governments prior to the UNCharter invoked the right of self-defense against the acts of individuals in numerous cases, such as
924 See, e.g., C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States inInternational Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 455, 464-66 (1952-II).
25 See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, para. 191 (“it will be necessary to distinguishthe most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other lessgrave forms”); Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 18, para. 51; see also I THE CHARTER OF THEUNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 796 (Bruno Simma, ed. 2d ed. 2002) (noting that “armedattacks” must be “military actions [that] are on a certain scale and have a major effect, and arethus not to be considered mere frontier incidents”); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION ANDSELF-DEFENCE 173-74 (3d ed. 2001) (“There is no doubt that, for an illegal use of force toacquire the dimensions of an armed attack, a minimal threshold has to be reached. . . . In theabsence of an armed attack, self-defence is not an option available to the victim State . . . .).
26 See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, para. 195.
27 Id.
28 Id., paras. 210-11.
seizure of vessels engaged in smuggling.24This inherent right of self defense is preserved under Article 51 “if an armed attack occurs.”In the Nicaragua case, the Court found that, in establishing that an “armed attack” has occurred, thestate invoking a right of self-defense must establish that it has been the target of a large-scale use offorce, such as an invasion or a bombardment or other “most grave forms of the use of force.”25Moreover, the Court found that such force could occur either through the use of regular armed forcesor by “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries.”26However, if a state simply provides weapons or logistical support to a non-state actor, which in turnuses force against a second state, such action does not constitute an “armed attack” by the first statewithin the meaning of Article 51, and therefore the second state has no right to self-defend againstthe first state.27 The Court did not directly address whether the second state could engage in “counter-intervention,”28 nor whether the second state could regard the actions of a non-state actor as an
10
29 In the Nicaragua case, El Salvador asserted to the Court, among other things, thatNicaragua was providing “houses, hideouts and communication facilities” to the insurgents(“terrorists”) that were attacking El Salvador. Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, para. 132. TheCourt found that until early 1981, “an intermittent flow of arms was routed via the territory ofNicaragua to the armed opposition in El Salvador” without reaching any specific findings as tohow much insurgent activity was occurring in Nicaragua as opposed to El Salvador. Id., para.160.
30 See, e.g., Jennings Dissenting Opinion, Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, at 544 (“itseems dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defence, so as toleave a large area where both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the United Nationsemployment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is absent.”).
31 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 801(commentary by Professor Albrecht Randelzhofer that “[t]aking into consideration modernpractice of international terrorism, today I am of the opinion that the statement of the ICJ is muchtoo sweeping. . . and needs further differentiation. Otherwise it would lead to the result thatStates are not sufficiently protected by Article 51 of the Charter against force committed by otherstates in an indirect manner, thus eroding the very purpose of the Charter. ”); ROSALYN HIGGINS,PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 250-51 (1994) (“Thatfinding has occasioned a torrent of criticism, the critics contending that it is an encouragementfor low-grade terrorism because the state at whom it is directed cannot use self-defence againstit.”).
“armed attack,” nor clarify whether it makes a difference if the non-state actor operates solely withinthe second state.29The Court’s finding in Nicaragua was criticized at the time by members of the Court30 andremains controversial today,31 since it suggests that what states cannot do directly (send militaryforces into another state), it can do indirectly by providing weapons and other assistance to non-stateactors who it knows will pursue the same objective. The Court’s advisory opinion appears to takethis restrictive interpretation of Article 51 to a further level, by expressly stating that the second statecannot regard the actions of the non-state actor as an “armed attack” justifying a use of force againstthe non-state-actor’s camps or hide-outs located across a border. While the Court’s opinion wouldallow such a defensive response if the non-state actor’s conduct can be “imputed” to the first state,
11
32 By analogy, it would seem that the second state also could not engage in “counter-intervention” against the first state (in other words, could not take measures that intervene in thefirst state’s internal affairs that fall short of a use of force).
the Court (per Nicaragua) apparently does not regard the provision of weapons or logistical support(for example, the use of communications facilities) by the first state to the non-state actor as resultingin imputation, nor regards imputation as arising by the first state simply tolerating the presence ofthe non-state actor.32 In the event that the first state lacked capacity to stop the non-state actor, andwas unwilling to receive assistance from the second state in stopping the non-state actor (perhapsfor internal political reasons), Nicaragua implies that this, too, apparently would be a situation wherethe non-state actor’s conduct could not be imputed to the first state.If this is what the Court means by “imputed” in its advisory opinion, then the upshot of theCourt’s present jurisprudence appears to be that under the UN Charter (1) a state may provideweapons, logistical support, and safe haven to a terrorist group; (2) that group may then inflictviolence on another state of any level of gravity, even with weapons of mass destruction; (3) thesecond state has no right to respond in self-defense against the first state because the first state’sprovision of such assistance is not an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51; and (4) thesecond state has no right to respond in self-defense against the terrorist group because its conductcannot be imputed to the first state, absent a showing that first state “sent” the terrorist group on itsmission. Such a legal construct, if intended, seems unlikely to endure.A conceivable explanation might be that the requirement of “necessity” embedded withinArticle 51 as a matter of customary international law requires that, before resorting to self-defense,a state must satisfy itself that the state in which the non-state actor is located is unwilling or unableto take steps necessary to remove the threat caused by the non-state actor. Under this interpretation,
12
33 See, e.g., Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 18, at para. 76 (“In this connection, theCourt notes that there is no evidence that the United States complained to Iran of the militaryactivities of the platforms, . . . which does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seenas a necessary act.”)
34 That approach would be consistent with the Court’s decision in the Corfu Channelcase, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Merits), which notes “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow itsterritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.” In that case, the Court neverestablished who had laid the mines that damaged the U.K. warships; rather, it placed anevidentiary burden on Albania to disprove its involvement given Albania’s control over theterritory in which the mines were laid. When Albania did not do so, the Court held that Albaniawas responsible. Such an obligation is embedded more generally in the doctrine of sic utere tuout alienum non laedas (one must use his own so as not to injure others), which in turn hasstrongly influenced developments in the field of international environmental law.  See TrailSmelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. 1911; Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development,principal 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 ILM 874 (1992).
the finding would not be that Article 51 “has no relevance” to self-defense against an attack by anon-state actor but, rather, that the necessity of defending cannot be established if there is still apossibility that another state could terminate the threat. Such an interpretation would be consistentwith other decisions of the Court regarding the exercise of self-defense, which at times have askedwhether there were peaceful alternatives available, such as pursuing diplomatic efforts.33  But undersuch a position, the focus is less on whether a prior armed attack can be imputed to a state, than onwhether that state is capable of preventing further attacks and is willing to do so.34 In the context ofthe Court’s consideration of Israel’s conduct, it is unclear why this standard of necessity is not met.Either there is no other state capable of, or willing to, end the terrorist attacks against Israel, or thereis such a “state” in the form of the nascent Palestine that, despite repeated efforts of the Israeligovernment, has proven unwilling or unable to end such attacks.State practice under Article 51. Third, whatever might have been the original meaning of
13
35 Subsequent practice by states in the application of a treaty is regarded as relevant insome circumstances for purposes of interpreting the treaty. See VCLT, supra note 11, Art.31(3)(b), 1155 UNTS at 340. 
36 SC Res. 1368, pmbl. (Sept. 12, 2001).
37 SC Res. 1373, pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001).
38 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 at 2 (Sept. 12, 2001) (statement by Secretary Generalthat “[a]ll of us condemn [the attack] and those who planned it—whoever they may be—in thestrongest possible terms.”).
Article 51, subsequent state practice35 appears to support the ability to respond in self-defense to anattack by a non-state actor, just as occurred in the Caroline incident. The most dramatic example ofinvoking Article 51 in response to the attack of a non-state actor arose with respect to the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001. The next day, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368, whichaffirmed—in the context of such terrorist attacks—“the inherent right of individual and collectiveself-defense in accordance with the Charter” and the need “to combat by all means” the “threats tointernational peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”36  Shortly thereafter, similar languageappeared in Security Council Resolution 1373.37There is certainly no language in these resolutions indicating a belief by the Security Councilthat terrorist acts must first be imputed to a state in order to trigger a right of self-defense underArticle 51. Indeed, as of September 12, the United States had made no claim that the September 11attacks were to be imputed to any particular state, nor did the Secretary-General or any of theSecurity Council members make such an assumption.38 This practice by the Security Councilpresumably should have been probative for the Court’s Article 51 finding in the Israeli Wall opinionsince, when interpreting the UN Charter previously, the Court has regarded relevant state practice
14
39 See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inNamibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21) (using such practice to interpret the voting requirements of UN Charterarticle 27(3)); Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the UnitedNations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 9 (Mar. 3) (looking to the practice of the Security Council and GeneralAssembly when interpreting UN Charter provisions on admission of states to the UnitedNations).
40 See Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,supra note 4, para. 35  (emphasis added); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE:STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 54 (2002) (Resolution 1368 “clearlyconfirms the right of victim states to treat terrorism as an armed attack . . .”); Gray, supra note20, at 165 (“[I]t seems clear from the international reaction at the time that the members of theSecurity Council were in fact willing to accept the use of force in self-defence by the USA inresponse to the terrorist attacks.”); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some CrucialLegal Categories of International Law, 12 EJIL 993, 996 (2001) (finding that the “events of 11September have dramatically altered the [self-defense] legal framework”).
as including actions of states when operating as members of a UN organ.39 As Judge Kooijmansnoted in his separate opinion:
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognize the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence without making any reference to an armed attack by a State. . . . This new elementis not excluded by the terms of Article 51 since [Article 51] conditions the exercise of theinherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this armedattack must come from another State even if this has been the generally acceptedinterpretation for more than 50 years. The Court has regrettably by-passed this new element,the legal implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but which marks undeniably a newapproach to the concept of self-defence.40
The Security Council’s interpretation of the meaning of Article 51 in respect of a non-state
15
41 On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council agreed that, if it was determinedthat the September 11 incidents were directed from abroad against the United States, “it shall beregarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armedattack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attackagainst them all.” NATO Press Release No. 124, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept.12, 2001), <http://www.nato.int>; see North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, Art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241,34 UNTS 243 (expressly referring to the exercise of self-defense “recognized by Article 51 of”the UN Charter). On October 2, after being briefed on the known facts by the United States, theNorth Atlantic Council determined that it was “clear and compelling” that “the attack against theUnited States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as anaction covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty . . . .” NATO, Statement by NATOSecretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), <http://www.nato.int>. Even at this stage, therewas no attribution by NATO of the attacks to a foreign state. 
42 O.A.S. Doc. RC.24/RES.1/01, OEA/Ser.F/II.24 (Sept. 21, 2001) (resolution of OASministers of foreign affairs that “these terrorist attacks against the United States of America areattacks against all American states” triggering the reciprocal assistance provisions under the RioTreaty). 
43 As Malcolm Shaw notes, “[a]ccordingly, the members of both these alliances acceptedthat what happened on 11 September constituted an armed attack within the meaning of Article51 of the Charter.” SHAW, supra note 20, at 1028. The reactions of NATO and the OAS may beof particular interest, in that Article 51 was incorporated into the Charter at the 1945 SanFrancisco conference principally as a means of accommodating the resort to self-defense byregional organizations. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BYSTATES 270 (1963).
44 The United States did assert that Al Qaeda was “supported by the Taliban regime inAfghanistan” and that the attacks were “made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime toallow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [Al Qaeda] as a base of operation.”Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America
threat appears to have been shared by all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization41and of the Organization of American States.42 In viewing the September 11 incident as an “attack”triggering collective defense obligations, neither alliance asserted that responsibility for the incidentsmust first be imputed to a foreign state.43 Thereafter, on October 7, the United States notified the UNSecurity Council in accordance with Article 51 that the United States was deploying forces intoAfghanistan in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense.44
16
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/946(Oct. 7, 2001).Yet there is nothing in the U.S. report to the Security Council, nor in the views ofother states at the time, reflecting a belief that imputation of the attacks to the state ofAfghanistan was necessary prior to acting upon such a right of self-defense. See GRAY, supranote 20, at 166 (“Both [the United States and United Kingdom] thus left uncertain what degree ofinvolvement, if any, by Afghanistan was necessary to justify the use of force against itsterritory.”)
45 See generally THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONALCOMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) (providing an accountof the events leading up to and including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
46 The Court spoke of where the terrorist threat originated, whereas Judge Kooijmansspoke of where the terrorist acts originated. Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans,  para. 36,Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
The Court’s only effort to address Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 comes in thesecond part of its Article 51 finding. The Court states that those resolutions are not relevant because“the threat which [Israel] regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and notoutside,” territory under Israeli occupation. The implication of this finding is that, in the case of theSeptember 11 attacks, the threat originated outside territory under U.S. control, and therefore theSecurity Council resolutions concerned a situation different that faced by Israel. Why such a factualdifference is material for the application of Article 51, however, is left unexplained by the Court.Moreover, why the Court saw a factual difference between September 11 and the attacks againstIsrael is also not obvious. The September 11 attacks were committed by nineteen men resident in theUnited States by seizing aircrafts in the United States and crashing them into buildings in the UnitedStates.45 In at least an immediate sense, the threat “originated” in territory under U.S. control.46 Thenineteen men did receive training, instructions, and funds from outside the United States (althougheven today the issue of funding remains cloudy), but the Court does not explain why that constitutesa threat originating outside the United States. Conversely, while the Court states without citation that
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47 Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 139.
48 Written Statement of Israel, para. 3.59 (Jan. 29, 2004), Legal Consequences AdvisoryOpinion, supra note 4.
49 Id., para. 3.61.
50 Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans,  para. 35, Legal Consequences AdvisoryOpinion, supra note 4. 
Israel itself regards the threat against it as originating within occupied territory,47 Israel clearly statedto the Court in its written submission that the terrorist attacks had significant foreign connections.Israel identified four principal Palestinian terrorist organizations, and described attacks committedby each group against Israel. Israel stated that one of them, the Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine, “receives logistical support from, and safe haven in, Syria,”48 while another, PalestineIslamic Jihad, “receives support, sponsorship and safe haven from Syria, Lebanon and Iran . . . .”49The Court left unexplained why such support nevertheless means that the threat to Israel onlyoriginated in territory under Israeli control.Any assumption that these two Security Council resolutions alone are the only relevant statepractice—and Judge Kooijman’s view that prior to 2001 there was a “generally accepted”interpretation of Article 51 calling for only self-defense against state action50—would be debatableand would merit further explanation. Although not always cast in terms of a right of self-defense,some state practice since 1945 evinces a belief that states may act against non-state actors in theexercise of a right of protection against threats, such as against stateless vessels on the high seas. Forexample, in 1985, U.S. military aircraft  intercepted an Egyptian aircraft over the Mediterranean Seaand forced it to land in Italy so that alleged terrorists on board the craft could be seized and
18
51 For a discussion of the Achille Lauro affair, see ANTONIO CASSESE, TERRORISM,POLITICS AND THE LAW: THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR (S.J.K. Greenleaves trans., 1989).
52 Invoking a right of self-defense under Article 51, Israel crossed into the Sinai in 1956in pursuit of Palestinian terrorists and attacked Palestinian camps in Lebanon during 1970-83 andin Tunisia in 1985. During 1976-85, South Africa attacked camps of the Southwest AfricaPeople’s Organization (SWAPO) in Angola, and made similar raids into Lesotho, Swaziland, andZambia.
53 See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 51, at 66-67 (finding the 1985 interception of the aircraftcontaining the Achille Lauro terrorists unjustifiable under Article 51); Cassese, supra note 38, at996 (finding that a majority of states prior to September 11 did not accept recourse to self-defense by the targeting terrorist bases in a host country).
prosecuted.51 While such actions occur outside the territory of any state and therefore may bedistinguishable from typical situations of self-defense by a state, arguably those precedents are ofparticular relevance with respect to the West Bank and Gaza strip, areas not regarded at present asformally within the territory of any recognized state. Moreover, there are various incidents ofpractice prior to September 11 in which self-defense was invoked against non-state actors operatingwithin foreign states, whether they be terrorists or insurgents that threaten the defending states. TheUnited States, Israel, and South Africa have all invoked a right of self-defense to enter the territoryof other states to attack terrorist camps or other facilities.52 Similar invocations of Article 51 may befound when states have attacked insurgents by crossing into neighboring states, such as Senegal’sincursion into Guinea-Bissau, Thailand’s incursion into Myanmar (Burma), and Tajikistan’sincursion into Afghanistan, all in the 1990’s.Whether such practice evinces an emergent norm under Article 51 requires serious analysisof such incidents, including the legal justification stated by the allegedly defending state and theresponse of the global community to that justification. Many scholars view such incidents asunlawful deviations from the jus ad bellum,53 while others detect an emerging norm in response to
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54 FRANCK, supra note 40, at 65.
55 Letter Dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United Statesof America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.S/1998/780 (1998).
56 See William Drozdiak, European Allies Back U.S. Strikes: Japan Says It“Understands,” WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at A20.
57 See Letter Dated 21 August 1998 from the Chargé d*Affaires A.I. of the PermanentMission of Kuwait to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNDoc. S/1998/789 (1998).
the rise in global terrorist activity. Thus, Thomas Franck suggests there may be emerging in theSecurity Council and General Assembly “a greater tolerance for states that carry their wars withterrorists and insurgents across borders to strike at safe havens.”54An example of that tolerance may be seen with respect to the 1998 Al-Qaeda-sponsoredbombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed nearly300 people (including twelve Americans). The United States invoked its “right of self-defenseconfirmed by Article 51”55 and launched cruise missiles against training camps in Afghanistan andagainst a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant allegedly serving as a chemical weapons facility. Perhapsthe U.S. attacks were unlawful, but the global reaction to the attacks suggests a measure ofacceptance. While some states condemned the attacks, others supported them, including Australia,France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom.56 Neither the General Assembly nor theSecurity Council condemned the attacks. The League of Arab States condemned the attack on theSudan, but was silent regarding the attack on Afghanistan.57 Perhaps the U.S. attacks were lawfulbecause Al Qaeda’s conduct was “imputed” to the Sudan and Afghanistan. If so, that would suggesta fairly broad (and perhaps meaningless) standard for finding “imputation” of conduct. No Sudanese
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58  Letter Dated 20 August 1998, supra note 55.
59  FRANCK, supra note 40, at 67.
or Afghan government organs were involved in the attacks on the U.S. embassies, or controlled ordirected such attacks, and neither government acknowledged and adopted the attacks as their own.The most that the United States could claim was that it had made “repeated efforts to convince theGovernment of the Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activitiesdown . . . .”58The tolerance of such cross-border incursions, however, likely has less to do with the ideaof imputing conduct to a state, and more with the objectionable conduct arising with someconsistency in an identifiable territory outside the territory of the victim-state.
It is becoming clear that a victim-state may invoke Article 51 to take armedcountermeasures in accordance with international law and UN practice against any territoryharboring, supporting or tolerating activities that culminate in, or are likely to give rise to,insurgent infiltrations or terrorist attack. That much is becoming cognizable as applicablelaw.59
Under such a standard, Israel is entitled as a legal matter to invoke Article 51 as the basis for actsagainst terrorist attacks from outside Israel’s borders although, of course, it might be established asa factual matter that the terrorist attacks were not grave enough to trigger a right of self-defense, orthat Israel’s response was unnecessary or disproportionate.Article 51's negotiating history. Fourth, if resort to the travaux préparatoires of the UN
21
60 The Court reverted to the travaux préparatoires of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in thecourse of its advisory opinion. See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para.95. Treaty interpretation, however, only calls for recourse to the travaux if the initialinterpretation leads to an ambiguous or obscure meaning, or to an absurd or unreasonable result.See VCLT, supra note 11, Art. 32, 1155 UNTS at 340. Further, there is some authority for theproposition that, when interpreting the text of the constitution of an internationalorganization—such as the UN Charter—the original intention of the drafters of the constitutionshould not be emphasized, since the parties may increase or change, and because such aconstitution, by its nature, should not be viewed as static. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of theUnited Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962 ICJ 151, 185 (July 20) (separateopinion of Judge Spender). 
61 See Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the UnitedNations Charter: A Search for Original Intent, 3 WYOMING L. REV. 663, 693, 695-97, 699-700(2003). 
62 Id. at 702-05 (quoting U.S. delegate Harold Stassen).
Charter is appropriate,60 it reveals some evidence that Article 51 was not limited to self-defense bystates against other states. The drafts of what became Article 51 were initially developed within thedelegation of the host country for the San Francisco Conference, the United States. The early U.S.drafts on May 10-11, 1945, contained language that recognized the  right of a member state to defendagainst an attack by another state.61 Such limiting language was then dropped in the course ofaccommodating U.K. and French concerns, even though in doing so the U.S. delegation noted thatit “opened very widely the field for the exercise of the right of self-defense.”62 The accommodationwas not focused on allowing states to defend against non-state actors; it was prompted by a desireto ensure that states could self-defend even in the absence of a regional arrangement. Nevertheless,the language was changed so as to broaden the scope of the right of self-defense recognized underArticle 51, with no state insisting on the retention of language that would restrict self-defense toattacks only by other states.
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63 Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, para. 531 (Jan. 30, 2004), LegalConsequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4. 
64 Id., para. 532.
65 Id., para. 533.
66 Id., para. 534; Provisional Verbatim Record, Legal Consequences, CR 2004/1, at 44-45(Feb. 23, 2004) (statement of Professor Georges Abi-Saab).
II.  FACTS AND THE JUS AD BELLUM
The Palestinian delegation to the Court did not urge the Court to find that Article 51 wasinapplicable because it only concerns a state attacking another state. Rather, Palestine’s argumentswere more sophisticated: (1) the acts of violence committed against Israel did not rise in gravity tothe level of being an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51;63 (2) since Article 51 does notallow self-defense against a future armed attack, the construction of the “wall” cannot be justifiedas a means of preventing such an armed attack;64 (3) self-defense under Article 51 must beproportionate to the actual or imminent harm, and the construction of the “wall” is not;65 and (4)Israel’s rights to use force within the occupied territory are governed exclusively by the jus in belloas lex specialis, such that any rights existing under Article 51 are displaced and cannot be invoked.66To consider and dispose of these arguments, the Court would have had to grapple with thefacts associated with Israel’s assertion that it was the victim of repeated terrorist attacks. The Courtcould not find that those attacks failed to rise to a level of an “armed attack” without systematicallyreviewing the nature and gravity of the terrorist attacks against Israel. The Court could not find thatIsrael was acting in preemptive self-defense without determining that an “armed attack” had not yetoccurred by virtue of the thousands of Israelis that Israel told the Court were killed and injured over
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67 Written Statement of Israel, supra note 48, para. 0.2.
68  See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius Ad Bellum and Ius inBello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221 (1983).
69 See UN CHARTER Art. 103.
the past four years.67 The Court could not assess whether the construction of a barrier was aproportionate response to the threat of attack without engaging in a serious review of Israel’sallegations about that threat.The final Palestinian argument that the jus ad bellum (including Article 51) is set aside inoccupied territory may or may not be correct as a legal matter. Many scholars see a linkage betweenthe jus ad bellum and the jus in bello (such as with respect to their respective use of customary ruleson necessity and proportionality) without seeing one body of law as wholly displacing the other.68Asa hierarchical matter, rights and obligations arising under the UN Charter would seem to trump thosearising in the Hague Regulations or Geneva Conventions, or for that matter in human rightsconventions.69 To the extent that the Court had viewed Article 51 as displaced by (or perhapssubsumed within) the jus in bello—or had simply found that a state in exercising a right of self-defense must always comply with the jus in bello—then the Court could have completely avoidedissuing its dubious interpretation of Article 51. Yet the Court still would have needed to confrontmuch more directly the myriad aspects of the jus in bello which accord to a belligerent—includingan occupying power— the ability to defend itself, and to apply the facts on the ground to that law.For example, the Court would have needed to grapple with Article 27 of the Fourth GenevaConvention, which provides that the occupying power may take “measures of control and securityas may be necessary as a result of the war.” Such measures may include, according to the Pictet
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70 ICRC COMMENTARY PUBLISHED UNDER THE GENERAL EDITORSHIP OF JEAN S. PICTET,IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS 207 (1958).
71 Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 135 (“on the materialbefore it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions carried out . . were rendered absolutelynecessary by military operations”); id. para. 140 (“In light of the material before it, the Court isnot convinced that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was the only means tosafeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for thatconstruction.”)
72 Id., para. 121.
commentary, “prohibition of access to certain areas” or “restrictions of movement.”70As it happened, the Court’s opinion reveals no effort to consider any of the facts that mighthave justified Israeli defensive measures, even to discount those facts as inadequate. The Court’s jusin bello analysis, along with its discussion of human rights law, recounts in some detail (to the pointof repeated reference to statistics) the harm to the Palestinian people from the construction of thebarrier, but evinces no analysis whatsoever of the threat that, according to Israel, justified thecreation of the barrier. The Court simply makes two vague statements that, “in light of the materialbefore it,” the Court “is not convinced” that Israel’s actions were necessary,71 and finds that thebarrier “could well become permanent” (notwithstanding Israel’s assurance that it would not), andthus was unlawful.72 But why was the Court not convinced that Israel’s actions were necessary? Whatfacts raised by Israel in its Written Statement—or in any of the numerous Israeli reports andstatements to the United Nations over the past four years—did the Court find unconvincing? Did theCourt believe that terrorist attacks were not occurring, or that they were occurring but not at a levelsufficient to justify construction of a barrier, or that a barrier was justified but that the route selectedby Israel was not tailored narrowly to address the threat? And exactly what “material” was the Courtlooking at in reaching its sweeping statements? It is no surprise that Judge Buergenthal, in his
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73 Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, para. 3, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,supra note 4.
74 Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly ResolutionES-10-13, UN Doc. A/ES-10/248  (Nov. 24, 2003).
75 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, IncludingPalestine, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003).
76 Dossier, Materials Compiled Pursuant to Article 65, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of theInternational Court of Justice (Jan. 19, 2004), Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note4 [hereinafter Dossier]. 
77 UN Doc. A/ES-10/248, supra note 74, at para. 4 & Annex I, para. 6.
dissenting declaration, called the Court to task for failing “to ascertain all relevant facts bearingdirectly on issues of Israel’s legitimate right of self-defence, military necessity and security needs,given the repeated deadly attacks in and upon Israel proper coming from the Occupied PalestinianTerritory to which Israel has been and continues to be subjected . . . .”73The Court may have failed to confront these facts from a belief that such facts were notbefore it. The principal sources of information relied upon by the Court appear to have been aneleven-page report by the Secretary-General74 and a fifteen-page report of a Special Rapporteur ofthe Commission on Human Rights,75 plus a dossier of materials compiled for the Court by theSecretary-General.76 Neither report undertook a serious factual analysis of the terrorist threat toIsrael, or whether a barrier was a necessary and proportionate response to that threat. The Secretary-General’s report stated that the Israeli cabinet approved the construction of the “wall” after “a sharprise in Palestinian terror attacks in the spring of 2002,” and devoted two sentences in an annex toIsraeli victims from suicide bombers entering Israel from the West Bank,77 but did not recount anyother facts relating to such attacks, nor whether the “wall” would likely stem the attacks. The Special
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78 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6, supra note 75, para. 8.
79 See, e.g., Dossier, supra note 76, Doc. 46, at 3 (statement on October 21, 2003, of UNUndersecretary General for Political Affairs to the Security Council stating that “[w]e recognizeIsrael’s right to defend itself against terrorist attacks.”).
80 Id., Doc. 40, at 5-10 (statement of Israeli Ambassador Dan Gillerman to the GeneralAssembly, referred to supra note 1); id., Doc. 44, at 7-12 (statement of Israeli AmbassadorGillerman to the Security Council).
81 See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 57. 
82 Israel’s statements to the United Nations, many of which are not contained in theSecretary-General’s dossier, can most easily be accessed through Israel’s mission in New York.See < http://www.israel-un.org>.
Rapporteur’s report simply stated that “[p]ossibly, the Wall will assist in the achievement of theGovernment’s publicly declared goal—to prevent suicide bombers from reaching Israeli territory,”but that this is “doubted by some.”78 The lack of attention to such issues is no fault of the reporters;their mandate was not to analyze factually or legally Israel’s right of self-defense but, rather, to reporton whether Israel was stopping construction of and dismantling the “wall” (the Secretary-General’sreport) or on whether there were violations of human rights in the “Occupied Arab Territories” (thespecial rapporteur’s report). The dossier prepared by the Secretary-General also contained nodocuments directed specifically at informing the Court regarding Israel’s claim of self-defense,although some verbatim records of meetings before the General Assembly and the Security Counciltouched upon the issue,79 particularly those containing Israel’s representations.80Of course many facts relating to Israel’s arguments regarding the need for a barrier werereadily available in the public domain, as the Court itself acknowledged.81 In addition to Israel’smyriad statements before United Nations,82 the Israeli Foreign Ministry had issued variousstatements regarding terrorist attacks on Israel and the need for such a barrier to stem those attacks,
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83 See, e.g., Israel Foreign Ministry Press Release, Saving Lives: Israel’s Anti-TerroristFence—Answers to Questions (Jan. 1, 2004). Such documents may be found at<www.securityfence.mfa.gov.il> For Israel Ministry of Defense documents concerning thebarrier, see <www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/>.
84 For an example of an Israeli government pleading in Israeli courts addressing, amongother things, the placement of a portion of the barrier (filed at approximately the time of theInternational Court’s receipt of written pleadings for the advisory opinion), see PreliminaryResponse on Behalf of the Respondents (Jan. 2004), HaMoked: Center for the Defense of theIndividual v. State of Israel, H.C.J. 9961/03, at<http://www2.colman.ac.il/law/concord/separation_barrier/articles/petition3827.pdf>. For alisting of cases in Israeli courts regarding the barrier, see id., paras. 25-26.
85 See Israeli State Comptroller, Audit Report on the Seam Area 35 (July 2002) (inHebrew), discussed in B’tselem, Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations as a Result ofIsrael’s Separation Barrier 26 (Mar. 2003), at<http://www.btselem.org/Download/2003_Behind_The_Barrier_Eng.pdf> (position paper byIsraeli human rights group). The comptroller’s report was issued a month after the Israeligovernment’s decision to erect the barrier.
including statistics on attacks and the effectiveness against terrorism of a similar barrier constructedaround the Gaza Strip.83 In these statements and in various proceedings before Israeli courts, theIsraeli government argued that the placement of the barrier, depending on the location, was drivenby various concerns,  such as population density, environmental effects, topography (for example,the need to allow for adequate observation from the barrier’s patrol road), providing sufficient timeto locate persons who have crossed the barrier before they can reach an area of safe refuge, andminimization of harm to cultivated farmland (for example, placing the barrier along an existingroad).84 At the same time, the Court could have considered Israeli government documents that wereadverse to its position. The Israeli Knesset “watchdog” comptroller’s office found in July 2002 that,since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, most of the suicide terrorists and the car bombscrossed the “green line” into Israel through porous checkpoints, suggesting that strengthening ofexisting checkpoints rather than construction of a new barrier was the necessary response.85 In its
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86 Article 50 of the Court’s statute provides that “[t]he Court may, at any time, entrust anyindividual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task ofcarrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.” Statute of the International Court of Justice,June 26, 1945, Art. 50, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. Article 67 of theCourt’s rules of procedure elaborate on this mechanism in the context of contentious cases.International Court of Justice Rules of Court, as amended Dec. 5, 2000, Art. 67, at <www.icj-cij.org> [hereinafter ICJ Rules of Court]. While the mechanism has not yet been used in theadvisory opinion context, the Court’s statute and rules provide that, in advisory opinions, theCourt shall be guided by the provisions of the statute and rules “which apply in contentious casesto the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.” ICJ Statute, Art. 68; ICJ Rules, Art.102; see III SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, 1733 (3d ed. 1997) (“the Court has a broad discretion with regard to the procedure to befollowed” in advisory opinions).
87 Corfu Channel, supra note 34, at 9.
88 Id. For the committee’s reports, see id. at 142, 152. In the same case, the Court alsoappointed two experts at the compensation stage to evaluate the damage sustained by the UnitedKingdom. See Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 244, 247 (Compensation).
advisory opinion, the Court made no explicit reference to such statements, nor to the widely-knownhistory of Israel’s vulnerability in the Middle East, which has entailed repeated armed conflicts withneighbors and an enduring exposure to terrorist attack, particularly since the second intifada brokeout. One might argue that the Court is not in a position to pull together such information on itsown, but the Court does have mechanisms at its disposal for independent fact-finding.86 In one ofthe first cases to come before the Court—one that involved important factual questions on the useof military force—the Court appointed a committee of three experts to make an independent studyof the facts in dispute between the two parties.87 After receiving a first report from the committee,the Court instructed the committee to conduct an on-site visit to verify and, if necessary, modify itsfindings. The committee then provided a second report to the Court, and the Court held a session forthe purpose of the judges asking questions directly to the committee members.88 The same avenue
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89 Resort to such fact-finding would have delayed for some period of time the Court’sopinion, but perhaps only by a matter of a few weeks or months, such that the opinion could stillhave been rendered within a year of the General Assembly’s request. The Court’s rules call uponthe Court to accelerate its procedures when the opinion is requested on an urgent basis, ICJ Rulesof Court, supra note 86, Art. 103, as was the case in this advisory opinion. However, in the pastthe Court has taken as long as a year to issue an advisory opinion that had been requested at “anearly date.” See S.C. Res. 284 (July, 29, 1970) (requesting advisory opinion relating to Namibiaat “an early date”); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inNamibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971I.C.J. 16 (advisory opinion of June 21).
90 See, e.g., Corfu Channel, supra note 34, at 17 (“the burden of proof rests upon him whoasserts the affirmative of a proposition that if no substantiated will result in a decision adverse tohis contention.”); Military and Paramilitary Activities in an Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 11, para. 101 (Nov. 26) (“it is the litigant seeking toestablish a fact who bears the burden of proving it; and in cases where evidence may not beforthcoming, a submission may in the judgment be rejected as unproved . . . .”).
91 See, e.g., Corfu Channel, supra note 34, at 18 (recognizing that indirect evidence andcertain presumptions may be appropriate where evidence is under the exclusive territorial controlof a state who declines to furnish such evidence).
lay open to the Court in this advisory opinion.89 Since Israel’s written statement to the Court—which focused on whether the GeneralAssembly’s question was properly before the Court—did not engage in a systematic analysis of thefacts relating to the threat to Israel, nor why the a barrier was a necessary and proportionate responseto that threat, it might be argued that there was no need for the Court to undertake one. If so, thenIsrael’s failure to plead in detail on this issue may have led the Court to adopt sub silentio a certainburden90 or presumption91 against Israel’s position. However, while resort to such a burden orpresumption might be appropriate in the context of a contentious case before the Court, doing so inan advisory opinion is dubious. The Court’s statute is quite clear that in contentious cases, the failure
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92 ICJ Statute, supra note 86, Art. 53(1). Moreover, even in a contentious case, the “non-appearance” of a state does not relieve the Court of its obligation to get the facts right. Even then,the Court is obligated to “satisfy itself . . . that the claim is well founded in fact and law.” ICJStatute, supra note 86, Art. 53(2). The Court has interpreted this obligation as implying “that theCourt must attain the same degree of certainty as in any other case that the claim of the partyappearing is sound in law, and, so far as the nature of the case permits, that the facts on which itis based are supported by convincing evidence.” Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, at para. 29.
93 ROSENNE, supra note 86, at 1733.
94 Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, paras. 49-50.
95  Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 5, at 28 (finding that it “appears nowto be very doubtful whether there would be available to the Court materials sufficient to enable itto arrive at any judicial conclusion upon the question of fact . . .”). The Court separately declinedto answer the question for a different reason—that Russia had not consented to the PermanentCourt’s jurisdiction and was not even a member of the League of Nations. Id. at 27-28.
of a party to defend its case may result in a finding by the Court in favor of a claimant state,92 but nosuch provision exists in the advisory opinion context. Unlike in a contentious case, Israel was underno obligation to file any pleadings with the Court, written or oral, let alone address particular factualissues in those pleadings. As Shabtai Rosenne notes, “since there are normally no ‘parties’ inadvisory cases, the role of the States and of international organizations is—or should be—limitedto that of an amicus curiae nature.”93 In such circumstances, there does not appear to be any basisfor reaching factual conclusions based on a failure of Israel to present facts to the Court. Perhaps thesubject matter of the advisory opinion looked similar to that of a contentious case, but the Courtitself characterized the matter before it as one that was not bilateral in nature and one that had a“much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute.”94 Moreover, in the Permanent Court’sEastern Carelia advisory opinion, the Court refused to answer the question in part because the Courtfound that Russia’s refusal to take part in the case meant that the Court would not have before it thematerials necessary to arrive at a judicial conclusion on the questions of fact;95 the Court was not of
31the view that it could simply find against Russia based on a failure to produce such materials.A second reason why the Court declined to engage in such a factual analysis may be that itis institutionally ill-equipped to do so. Whether sitting under its contentious or advisory jurisdiction,the Court operates as a court of first instance, called upon to decide difficult issues of internationallaw at the same time that it must develop and test a detailed factual record. The Court may or maynot receive assistance from states in developing that record, but even if it does, the Court has fewmeans for testing evidence and for resolving direct conflicts between evidence. Witness testimonyis possible, but discouraged by the Court, which seems uncomfortable when operating outside thestolid environment of government lawyers or familiar academics making scripted presentations. Thejudges rarely ask questions of the states who appear before it, and when they do, the responsesvirtually never entail presentation of additional evidence. As noted above, there are somemechanisms available to the Court for independent fact-finding, but the Court has fallen into a habitof not resorting to such mechanisms, in part because states typically prefer to keep control of theevidence placed before the Court. If detailed factual findings are later proven wrong, the Court’sreputation will suffer, such that there are benefits to reaching vague factual conclusions, even if this,too, has reputational consequences. In reaching its decisions, the Court must cope with thepotentially differing views of fifteen judges (sometimes more if additional ad hoc judges areappointed), and in trying to achieve a great a consensus as possible, findings on both fact and lawoften appear to be watered down or anodyne. While these difficulties are problematic in any case where there are factual disagreementsbetween states who come before the Court, they become especially so when dealing with jus adbellum issues. Judgments concerning the jus ad bellum can strike at the heart of states’ national
32
96 Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 38.
security interests, and determining whether states have engaged in an unlawful use of force or lawfulself-defense often will require especially careful and sophisticated analysis of state conduct whererelevant evidence is conflicting, secretive, and confusing. The stakes are high for the states who areimplicated in the Court’s finding, so much so that states may resist appearing before the Court, suchas occurred in the merits phase of the Nicaragua case and, to a certain extent, in this advisoryopinion. Moreover, the stakes are high for the Court as well; labeling a state as an aggressor isserious business, and could lead to further conflict if not handled carefully. Though the Court hasaddressed jus ad bellum issues only rarely, so far the Court appears extremely reluctant to find thata resort to military force is lawful. While it is possible that, by self-selection, the only cases thatcome before the Court are those where the alleged use of force is unlawful, it may also be that thejudges of the Court are simply uncomfortable indicating that any use of force is lawful, and insteadbelieve that states should always find means to resolve disputes pacifically.One way around these institutional difficulties in dealing with facts would be for the Court,at least when rendering advisory opinions relating to the jus ad bellum, to focus on legalinterpretations and stay away from application of the law to facts. While the Court claimed that itwas engaged in an analysis no different than it had undertaken in the past, such as in the NuclearWeapons advisory opinion,96 in fact the Court was going well beyond the abstract legal analysis thathas characterized most of its advisory opinions so as to apply the legal analysis in a very sweepingfashion to a complicated set of fact-based issues. The Court was not opining broadly on a legalquestion without reference to any particular state’s conduct (such as the status of nuclear weaponsunder international law), nor narrowly applying the law to a very discrete set of legal facts (such as
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97 An advisory opinion simply discussing the jus ad bellum legal framework might havefound that: (1) construction of a barrier within one’s own territory along a border does not violatethe jus ad bellum; (2) construction of a barrier in occupied territory as a general matter violatesthe necessity prong of the jus ad bellum, but might be justified as a matter of self-defense if thereis a threat to the occupying power that rises to a level of an “armed attack,” and if the barrier is anecessary and proportionate response to that threat; (3) in the context of a threat from terroristsuicide bombers, an “armed attack” only arises when [the threat can be imputed to a foreignstate] [the threat originates from outside the occupied territory] [the threat has a gravitycomparable to a large-scale use of force by a state] [other] ; (4) in the context of such an “armedattack,” a barrier is necessary only if there is no other alternative means of addressing the attackand is proportionate only if the barrier is designed in a manner that is directed at the threat and noother objective; and (5) the Court does not have before it sufficient facts to apply these principlesto the construction of the Israeli barrier. Of course, such an approach may have had a collateraleffect on the ability of the Court to reach definitive factual conclusions regarding the jus in belloas well.
the commencement of lawsuits against a UN special rapporteur). Instead, the Court was opiningbroadly on the permissibly of a barrier extending hundreds of kilometers without any considerationof whether placement of the barrier was permissible in some areas (due to security considerationsand minimal effects on civilians) while in other areas it was not. If the Court was unwilling or incapable of analyzing and deciding upon such a complex factpattern, it would have been much better for the Court to have avoided an Article 51 analysis entirely,such as by finding that a state in exercising a right of self-defense must always comply with the jusin bello. If the Court had to address the jus ad bellum, the Court should have either considered anddiscussed in detail the facts relating to Israel’s position for why it was engaging in self-defense, orshould have written its advisory opinion so as to set forth the legal framework relevant to this issuewithout definitively applying the framework to the facts.97
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98 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 23, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,supra note 4 .
99 Id.
100 Separate opinion of Judge Koroma, para. 10, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,supra note 4 .
III.  CONCLUSIONJudge Higgins’ lament regarding the Court’s analysis of the jus in bello seems equallyapplicable to its analysis of the jus ad bellum: “It might have been expected that an advisory opinionwould have contained a detailed analysis, by reference to the texts, the voluminous literature and thefacts at the Court’s disposal, as to”98 why Israel could not invoke Article 51. “Such an approachwould have followed the tradition of using advisory opinions as an opportunity to elaborate anddevelop international law.”99 Likewise, Judge Buergenthal’s lament regarding the Court’sunwillingness to pursue serious factual analysis relating to the jus ad bellum is fully justified.The Court would do well to heed these concerns. The Court currently has on its docket aseries of cases relevant to the jus ad bellum, including those brought by Serbia for the NATO attacksrelating to Kosovo, and those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Rwanda and Uganda.They are opportunities for the Court not only to decide concrete cases, but to help clarify in a cogentand thoughtful way the status of international law in its most critical area. States are only willing toyield power to an international court of fifteen individuals when they believe that the court’s findingsreflect higher levels of deliberation than exist within any one state’s machinery. Peremptory findingsthat lack deep levels of reasoning, that fail to take account of and to rebut divergent lines of thinking,are not salutary qualities for any court, let alone one that holds itself out as the “supreme arbiter ofinternational legality”.100 
